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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the Internet policies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
It discusses the ways the governing Communist Party of the PRC manipulates factors 
that regulate behaviour online to an extent that actually enables it to control the flows 
and content of information and subsequently, also, the politicisation of the Internet 
community. Consequently, such practices enable the ruling regime to maintain the 
status quo, allowing only minor, localised modifications to its policies and avoiding 
major political and ideological ruptures. The essay discusses the Internet conditions in 
China through the prism of Prof. Lawrence Lessig’s theory, adopting the same 
quadripartite system for analysing regulatory factors in relation to cyberspace 
behaviours. The analysis further demonstrates how the ruling party is realising 
Lessig’s fears in relation to the four identified categories of regulatory modalities and 
also how the government even adopts additional measures in order to preserve and 
extend its control through implicit, as well as aggressive tactics. The ultimate goal of 
this paper is to demonstrate how China might be formulating its own model of 
Internet governance and how this model might be gaining more power, becoming 
capable of eliminating, controlling or co-opting any serious challenges to it from 
internal and external influences. 
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1. Introduction 
In its early years, the Internet had been considered a globally interconnected medium 
with the potential to facilitate a new democratic reality, a hope that was eloquently 
expressed by many theorists and plain users.1 The open, decentralised technology of 
the medium, the geographical distribution of its users and the multi-faceted nature of 
its content, seem to pose serious challenges to any attempt to be regulated by any 
societal or state actors.2 However, it would appear that these hopes have not 
materialised, since limitations on the structuring of the Internet and also on the free, 
universal exchange of information have been widely developed and employed based 
on various cultural, religious, political or financial reasons, such as national security 
or copyright.3 The country with potentially the strictest regime worldwide in relation 
to information production and circulation, demonstrating the various ways cyberspace 
communications could be regulated, is the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP), which is currently ruling the PRC under a 
strange mixture of a single party communist model with capitalist aspirations, has 
been forced to adopt multiple measures and restrictions in order to structure the 
Internet in accordance with its cultural and political principles, but also facilitate 
China’s information technology-based economic development scheme.4 The question 
of whether such policies could be successful in regulating online behaviour and 
eventually managing to adequately censor and control the Internet experience of users 
within the PRC seems very much related to Lessig’s discussion of Internet regulation. 
A core part of his argument is that the Internet could be controlled very effectively 
and extensively, when laws, market policies, norms and code can be manipulated 
adequately by certain actors, such as the state.  
This paper assesses whether the Chinese state can or has already gained an adequate 
degree of control over all potentially engaged regulatory actors, enabling the 
government to extensively structure the Internet experience of its citizens and 
potentially shape global norms and standards, presenting a paradigm for other 
regimes. The analysis will attempt to show that the CCP has not just relied on 
traditional blocking of information and spreading of propaganda, which are the main 
regulatory dangers Lessig describes in relation to technological controls. It has 
additionally even adopted a more implicit tactic, attempting to use the informational 
                                                
1 J Barlow, “The Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace” (1996) available at 
https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-Final.html  (accessed 26 Jul 12); A Murray, The 
Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment (London: Routledge, 2007), at 5-7. 
2 C Li, “Internet Content Control in China” (2003-4) 8 International Journal of Communications Law 
and Policy, 39-69, at 47.  
3 See various examples in T Wu and J Goldsmith, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless 
World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Other examples would be the decisions of the UK 
government to filter or block social media during political events: J Halliday and J Garside, “Rioting 
Leads to Cameron Call for Social Media Clampdown” (2011) available at 
www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/11/cameron-call-social-media-clampdown (accessed 26 Jul 12). 
4 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China “The Internet in China” 
(2010) Editor: Piny Han, available at http://english.gov.cn/2010-06/08/content_1622956.htm (accessed 
26 Jul 12). 
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and civic potential of the medium for the benefit of the ruling Party. Finally, the 
discussion will demonstrate how the ruling regime has cracked down aggressively on- 
and offline against practices of users and even corporations that might have the 
potential to compromise its control. In order to set the groundwork for such 
discussion, Lessig’s views on the regulability of cyberspace will be elaborated and 
will subsequently be combined with an overview of the Internet realities in China. 
This process will connect the theory of regulation of cyberspace with the actual facts 
relating to China in order to demonstrate whether, how and to what extent the CCP 
realises the author’s fears, having also added a new twist to the modes and tactics 
elaborated. 
Before proceeding to the analysis, one methodological clarification is required. It is a 
common concern that papers about non-western, non-English speaking regimes, such 
as China here, which are written and are based on sources in English, would 
potentially provide a westernised, biased view of the facts. This choice of sources is, 
of course, partly due to the inevitable language barrier, which poses a difficulty for 
accessing sources written in Chinese. Nevertheless, in this analysis, care has been 
taken to include many sources that have direct references to Chinese sources or are 
authored or translated in English by Chinese citizens and academics, especially where 
views are expressed. Therefore, the facts and arguments included are related to reports 
and analyses that originate from Chinese sources to a large extent, albeit indirectly. 
Another difficulty in employing Chinese sources relates exactly to the problem that 
this essay discusses extensively, the fact that mainstream Chinese sources may be 
filtered and censored. Censorship in Chinese media would inevitably hinder any 
reporting and thorough analysis of views about freedom of information, regime 
oppression etc that are discussed in this paper, since such views would be considered 
controversial by the Chinese regime and would often be filtered and thus, harder to 
find or access. With these methodological difficulties in mind, the author has made 
extensive efforts to include a variety of sources, originating from China as well as 
from Chinese sources abroad. It is hoped that through such a process any concern of 
bias towards western views could be minimised to a degree that would render the 
essay as objective as possible under the circumstances.  
2. Lessig’s Theory: Code and other modalities of regulation online  
Lessig, in his book Code 2.0, a follow-up of his seminal work Code and other laws of 
Cyberspace, provides an analysis of Internet regulation, identifying four elements that 
can influence behaviour online. These are laws, market forces, social norms, and 
code, the equivalent of architecture in real-life, the physical and digital infrastructure 
of what we call cyberspace.5 Lessig is not the only one to have articulated this 
quadripartite theory of regulation, since similar analyses have been made by various 
theorists.6 Many have also criticised Lessig’s views on the role and interplay of these 
                                                
5 L Lessig, Code V.2.0 (New York: Basic Books, 2006), at 5-6, 24. 
6 Murray and Scott characterise the four types of controlling online behaviour as hierarchical controls, 
competition-based controls, community based controls and design-based controls, while Reidenberg 
articulates his regulatory modalities as States, private sector, citizen forces and technical interests; A 
Murray and C Scott, “Controlling the New Media: Hybrid Responses to New Forms of Power” (2002) 
65 The Modern Law Review, 491-516; J Reidenberg, “Lex Informatica: The Formulation of 
Information Policy Rules through Technology” (1997) 76 Texas Law Review 553-584.  
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modalities and their actual importance in regulation and the prevention of it.7 
Irrespective of the view one might be adopting, it is undeniable that Lessig has 
articulated his theory very explicitly and his work has formed a large part of 
regulatory discussion about cyberspace, despite any flaws. Consequently, an analysis 
on the Chinese reality through the basic structure and theorisation of Lessig could, at 
least, provide some insights and an initial basis for assessing the interplay of various 
regulatory actors and the potential outcomes. But let us look at the specifics of this 
theory more closely before viewing its applicability to the Chinese reality. 
Lessig focuses on code as a dominant element of regulation online and argues that the 
nature of Internet architecture is crucial in defining the regulability of certain 
behaviours.8 He admits that regulability of cyberspace might have appeared harder 
initially, due to the basic open-ended architectures of the Internet and the functions of 
the various applications, which did not differentiate between kinds of information and 
promoted a decentralised model of communications.9 However, he submits, this 
started to change after the commercialisation and popularisation of the medium, since 
economic interests and the need to facilitate and protect transactions and user 
interaction from phenomena such as cybercrime, induced companies to generate code 
that has made stricter regulation easier.10 As Zittrain has also argued in his book ‘The 
Future of the Internet and How to Stop it’, that the various security threats that abound 
in cyberspace have been a driving force for more intensely regulated systems, 
organised and managed by corporations and accessed through ‘appliances’ with 
prescribed functionalities, such as the game consoles or smart-phones. Such closed 
networks accessed by hardware that would be monitored and modified by 
corporations deprive users of the capacity to innovate, instead offering consumers 
bundles of quick and reliable information, which has been prescribed by the service-
providing businesses. Beyond this aspect, on a more legislative level, many states 
have promulgated laws that pose various restrictions on code and also on online 
behaviour, with penalties gradually intensifying globally.11  
However, Lessig believes that the final step will be taken by the governments in 
providing coding incentives that will integrate regulability into the heart of the 
Internet by influencing not just the applications, but more infrastructural principles 
dictating the functionality of the Internet, such as the non-prioritisation of 
information.12 Generation of controlling code has been a result not only of direct 
ordering, but mostly, as Lessig says, indirect, through the promulgation of regulations 
                                                                                                                                       
 J Goldsmith, “Against Cyberanarchy” (1998) 65 The University of Chicago Law Review, 1199-1250. 
7 V Mayer-Schonberger, “Demystifying Lessig” (2008) Wisconsin Law Review 713-746; D Post, 
“What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace” (2000) 52 Stanford Law Review 
1439-1459; D Wall, “Digital Realism and the Governance of Spam as Cybercrime” (2004) 10 
European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 309-335.  
8 L Lessig, see note 5 above, at 24. 
9 Ibid, 32. 
10 Ibid, 38.	  
11 The UK has been a typical example with the penalties for cybercrimes having doubled after 2006, 
whereas in the US there has been a constant intensification of strictness, especially after the USA 
Patriot Act in 2001.  
12 L Lessig, see note note 5 above, at 60-1. 
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by the state and facilitation of norms and market demands that create incentives and 
market opportunities that can change code-writing orientations.13 In his words: “... as 
code has become the product of companies, the power of East Coast Code (law-
making) has increased. When commerce writes code, then code can be controlled, 
because commercial entities can be controlled.”14 He further adds that: “Commerce 
has a purpose, and government can exploit that to its own end. It will, increasingly 
and more frequently, and when it does, the character of the Net will change. Radically 
so.”15 As it appears, Lessig believes that states could take advantage of the very 
obvious aims of markets to minimise risk, increase profits and induce commercial 
actors to promulgate code that conforms to less open standards. He further discusses 
how influencing the choice of code embeds values and social norms into the use of 
the Internet and demonstrates how choices of certain applications and architectures 
over others could enable whoever can exercise authority over the choices of the 
infrastructure and applications running on the Internet to gain control over 
cyberspace.16 
Moreover, Lessig highlights that these factors are not affecting behaviour 
independently, but instead are all interlinked and should be understood and assessed 
as a single interdependent regulating structure, constituted by distinct elements, which 
are malleable and can also influence the function of the rest.17 When the case of China 
is discussed, this interplay between the regulatory modalities will become more 
obvious. What seems crucial for the current analysis is his highlighting of how 
adequate regulation cannot possibly achieve, but does not even require, perfect 
effectiveness in order to be considered satisfactory. Arguably, all that is needed for 
achieving adequate control is the creation of numerous incentives and micro-controls, 
enforced with relative consistency, to render the various regulatory measures and the 
general regulatory philosophy behind them as the default.18  
As Mayer-Schonberger clarifies, Lessig’s theory is premised on the importance of 
maintaining transparency and variety of choice of Internet applications for users in 
order to preserve an open, unrestricted network, with his hopes lying with the 
beneficial power of the free market trying to maintain competition and innovation.19 
In an era, where major Internet companies such as Microsoft, Google or Apple could 
have a great financial and political influence, one could, naturally agree with Lessig’s 
view on the influence of such companies, at least partly. However, whether the 
conditions in the PRC would allow the market to maintain control and safeguard 
transparency and freedom of choice is another issue. This potential of the CCP to 
steer its market towards its desired direction will become clearer below when the 
function of Lessig’s identified modalities will be discussed in relation to the PRC 
more specifically. 
                                                
13 Ibid, 62-7. 
14 Ibid, 72.  
15 Ibid, 80. 
16 Ibid, 112-4. 
17 Ibid, 121,4. 
18 Ibid, 68, 73.	  
19 Mayer-Schonberger, see note 7 above, at 722-4. 
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3. Chinese Internet and the four modalities 
The Internet became quickly integrated in China as the ruling Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) linked its reformative, developmental goal and, consequently, its 
legitimacy to the adoption and promotion of new technologies.20 The public embraced 
the Internet and China had 384 million users by the end of 2009, which, in turn, built 
and nourished a bustling indigenous information technology economy, backed by 
international corporations that remained profitable even during the current global 
crisis.21 The PRC now has more Internet users than the US and is also above the 
global average on Internet coverage despite its gargantuan size.22  
Nevertheless, the Internet’s economic boost threatened the CCP’s overall control of 
society and the maintenance of its communist social values by facilitating behaviours 
considered immoral, criminal and undermining of national unity, such as gambling, 
access to pornography and mainly the proliferation of dissenting views.23 Increasing 
information flows also hindered the Party’s propaganda and information control 
policies – a presumably expected consequence of introducing information 
technologies to authoritarian regimes that suppress free speech.24 The response of the 
CCP was to promote state ownership and control of main Internet infrastructures and 
use of the Internet, developing a comprehensive, elaborate structure for regulating the 
Internet. Beyond legislation, this regulating structure relies on the cooperation of 
corporations, the intensification of prolific normative standards of the Chinese state 
and the deployment of technical measures in order to create an isolated web, where 
the information can be monitored and controlled extensively.25 The aspects of this 
multifaceted structure will be reviewed below, in order to demonstrate the relation of 
the Chinese Internet realities to Lessig’s analysis and his concerns for the direction 
Internet regulation could take in the future. 
3.1 The legal structure and the CCP’s control over it 
The first and main element of regulation is law. Chinese cyberlaws are generally 
based on the moral dictates of the CCP and are promulgated by its various public 
agencies, such as the Ministry of Information Industry (MII) and the Public Security 
Bureau, which together manage Internet gate-keeping and connectivity, designate the 
                                                
20 M Mueller and Z Tan, China in the Information Age: Telecommunications and the Dilemmas of 
Reforms (Westport Conn.: Praeger, 1996) Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Washington 
DC, at 57; Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, see note 4 above.  
21  Internet World Stats “China” (2012) available at www.internetworldstats.com/asia/cn.htm (accessed 
26 Jul 12); CCTV, “China’s Internet Economy Upbeat” (2009) available at 
http://www.china.org.cn/video/2009-11/03/content_18818834.htm (accessed 26 Jul 12). 
22 B Liang and H Lu, “Internet Development, Censorship, and Cyber Crimes in China” (2010) 26 
Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice 103-120, at 105 
23 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, see note 4 above.  
24 J Zittrain, The Future of the Internet and How to Stop it (Virginia: Yale University Press, 2008), at 
113-4. 
25 This regulatory structure has been named the ‘Great Firewall of China’.	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types of filtered information and more.26 The regime has also shaped regulations 
organising Internet use under a direct licensing/monitoring scheme of users and 
Internet Service and Content Providers (ISPs, ICPs) by state agencies.27 After the 
Internet’s popularisation, though, the burden of regulating connectivity and 
controlling access and information gradually became too elaborate for the public 
sector to handle by itself. Thus, additional statutes were generated, promoting the 
delegation and decentralisation of responsibility of control in order to frame every 
aspect of Internet use under the CCP’s dogma.  
The extensive web of legal regulations, which are only a small part of the web-like 
regime of regulations and restrictions, form the basis for entrapping all other 
regulatory actors into realising the goals of the CCP.28 Apparently, the government 
still maintains the command over legislative directions and enforcement, creating a 
structure of overlapping and vague provisions which it can interpret and implement 
according to its desired goals, with minimal internal and external resistance.29 
Moreover, the unchallenged discretionary interpretation of law by state-officials as 
well as the state’s monitoring of private service providers’ compliance with their 
mandatory regulatory duties, further empowers the state and disempowers the 
regulatees, leaving citizens and private actors ultimately unaware of the limitations of 
their actions.30  
3.1.1 Internal pressure 
In terms of internal, formal political resistance, mechanisms of legislative control are 
minimal.  Constitutional challenge processes or a dissenting official political party do 
not exist, while popular protests focus more on low-level political corruption, misuse 
of powers and unjust trials, rather than regulations at the highest level of political 
principles.31  There have been characteristic examples where online communities have 
                                                
26 L Solum, “Models of Internet Governance” (2008) University of Illinois Public Law Research Paper 
No. 07-25, at 69. 
27 For an account of the whole history and tendencies of Chinese cyberlaw and its changes in character, 
see: A Cheung “The Business of Governance: China’s Legislation on Content Regulations in 
Cyberspace” (2005-6) 38 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 1-37, at 12-
25; M Nawyn “Code Red: Responding to the Moral Hazard facing US Information Technology 
Companies in China” (2007) 2 Columbia Business Law Review 505-564, at 515-9. 
28 A typical example would be the restriction on Internet organisations citing foreign news without 
official approval and also the mandatory inspection and approval of all online publications: B Liang 
and H Lu, see note 22 above, at 108-9. 
29 For example, according to the “Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and 
Management Regulations”, it is punishable to access materials considered (a) subversive of state power 
or the socialist system; (b) damaging to national unity; (c) inciting discrimination between nationalities; 
(d) disturbing to social order; (e) propagating feudal superstition; ( f ) related to pornography, 
gambling, or violence; (g) insulting or libellous; and (h) violating the Constitution or other laws.” The 
vagueness of the above criteria is characteristic of the arbitrariness allowed by cyberlaws.  L Solum, 
see note 26 above, at 69.  
30 B Liang and H Lu, see note 22 above.  
31 T Kellog and K Hand “NPCSC: The Vanguard of China’s Constitution” (2008) 8 The Jamestown 
Foundation, China Brief available at 
http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=4666 (accessed 26 Jul 12); S 
Shroeder, “The Internet as a Tool for Political Activism in China” (2005) available at 
http://globalmon.civiblog.org/_attachments/1774557/Chinainternettoolforpoliticalactivism2.pdf, at 15-
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come together to uncover and criticise public officials’ or even plain citizens’ criminal 
or immoral acts, with satisfactory results, eventually even initiating a response from 
the state.32 One could perhaps argue that the Chinese blogger and Internet user 
community in general could provide some sort of corrective mechanism against the 
state’s inefficiencies and excesses. The Chinese government seems to also think that 
this could be so.33 Localised Internet engagement events, such as the “hiding from the 
cat” incident,34 indeed demonstrate the potential of online grassroots organising, 
which could impose a level of popular control on the potentially corrupt actions of 
state officials. However, the state has often appropriated these online civic efforts by 
taking advantage of the many different levels of political authority existing in such a 
vast country as the PRC. More particularly, the blame is often put on low-level 
officials, who are subsequently paradigmatically punished by the highest ranking 
rulers in accordance with public sentiment and CCP’s ideological/moral standards.35 
Consequently, public criticism online rarely touches the actually high-ranking 
officials of the Party and the corrupt low-level public servants can be portrayed as 
deviations from the just dictates of the regime and not as an actual part of the CCP 
and its systemic flaws. 
Moreover, some of those cases of cybercommunity organising have also raised 
concerns for their vigilantist consequences, which, in turn, have legitimised the 
government to produce legislation restricting such online initiatives in order to limit 
any feared excesses of public censure. More particularly, regulations have been 
promulgated in order to prevent “human flesh searches”, where users collaborate in 
order to find citizens that have acted reprehensibly and express their disapproval and 
condemnation of their acts, sometimes reaching even to the point of threatening the 
safety of those identified as the perpetrators.36 One cannot but suspect, though, that 
under the conditions of arbitrary enforcement of laws, common in the PRC, such laws 
could be employed to generally restrict civil initiatives online under alleged fears of 
vigilante reactions.  
In effect, the CCP manages, due to its size and multiple degrees of government 
agencies, to localise and detach any political conflict from its ideological core and 
make the requested political changes at a low-level, without the high-ranking officials 
shouldering any blame for the corruption or the inefficiencies of their inferiors. On the 
other hand, the Party passes laws that give it the power to arbitrarily turn against 
                                                                                                                                       
6 (accessed 26 Jul 12); on the protests and the aims of Chinese civil society see Z Tai “The Internet in 
China: Cyberspace and Civil Society” (New York: Routledge, 2006), at 216-253, 259-68. 
32 Z Tai, see note 31 above; B Liang and H Lu, see note 22 above.  
33 Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, see note 4 above, Part III. 
34 This case refers to the death of an inmate in a Chinese prison, where officials attempted to conceal 
the true facts by saying that the death had been caused by the inmate’s participation in a game with 
other inmates called “find the cat”. Research initiated by Internet users and bloggers led to the 
uncovering of the true facts, which proved that the inmate had been beaten to death by other inmates. 
This investigation eventually led the government to appoint Internet users as part of an assessment 
committee that would attempt to provide a report of the true facts, which ultimately led to the 
deposition of an official and the punishment of the inmates responsible for the injuries that led to the 
inmate’s death. B Liang and H Lu, see note 22 above, at 111. 
35 Ibid.	  
36 Ibid, 115-6. 
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online civic engagement that might seem controversial. Essentially, even if the CCP 
allows incidents of political activism, it has developed a capacity for taking advantage 
of such grassroots organising events and even promotes them at times. These 
practices thus, provide users with the illusion that Internet-based politicisation and 
democratisation is taking place with the tolerance or even support of the state. From 
the above one can infer that Internet-facilitated politicisation does take place in China, 
yet at a micro-level. However, micro-resistance does not automatically develop into 
macro-resistance, the latter being the kind of resistance that could seriously challenge 
the foundational principles and overarching political system of the Chinese regime.37 
If resistance is anticipated and co-opted by the power-holders, in this case the CCP, it 
will remain at a micro-level.38 Micro-resistance would improve conditions locally, but 
will not lead to a challenge to the legitimacy and ultimate authority of the CCP, thus 
preventing dissent from developing into a generalised move towards establishing 
citizen rights and democracy in China. 
3.1.2 External pressure 
The legislative prowess of the CCP is not ardently challenged from outwith the PRC 
either. Although many Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and rights groups 
have highlighted the restrictive policies of the CCP, enforced external pressure is low 
on behalf of states, as China’s political and financial influence and prospects hinder 
any potential criticism for fear of alienating the CCP.39 China’s limited concessions to 
international community admonitions mainly relate to its World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) obligations, but even these have not been thoroughly realised, causing many 
actions to be brought against China, mainly by the US, for inconsistent enforcement 
of its trade obligations.40 The PRC has lost many of these cases, relating mostly to 
preferential treatment of indigenous companies.41Despite governmental assurances 
that China will conform to the WTO accession agreements’ terms, in many cases, the 
changes have not been implemented or alternative regulations have substituted those 
abandoned, demonstrating a lack of capacity or willingness of the WTO constituents 
to impose the various obligations on China.42  Moreover, when confronted for its 
                                                
37 M Kelly, The Political Philosophy of Michel Foucault (New York: Routledge, 2009), at 109-10. 
38 Ibid. 
39 D Dickson, “China holds more US Debt than indicated” (2010) available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/02/chinas-debt-to-us-treasury-more-than-indicated/ 
(accessed 26 Jul 12); B Levisohn and O Biggadike, “China Euro Policy Denial Prompts Detection of 
Changes (Update2)” (2010) available at  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-06-01/china-euro-
policy-denial-prompts-detection-of-changes-update2-.html (accessed 26 Jul 12); A Guiora and S Riotte 
“China: Trade or Human Rights: Which comes First: The Canadian Model” (2007-8) 33 United States- 
Canadian Law Journal 11-24, at 12. 
40 W Morrison, “China-U.S. Trade Issues” Federal Publications Paper (Cornell University, 2011); A 
Wang, L Hornby and G Dyer, “Geithner softens his Stance on China” (2010) available at 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e62286e6-6697-11df-aeb1-00144feab49a.html (accessed 26 Jul 12); B 
Johnson, “US asks China to explain Google hacking claims” (2010) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/jan/13/china-google-hacking-attack-us (accessed 26 Jul 
12).  
41 W Morrison, see note 40 above, at 22 onwards. 
42 Ibid. 
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human rights violations, China rejects any criticisms as an intrusion on its 
sovereignty. This prevents any interference with its perception of punishable criminal 
and dangerous activity especially since many countries have imposed similar 
restrictions themselves on the bases of national security or intellectual property rights 
protection.43  
From the above facts, one can infer that the CCP is not endangered by what has been 
characterised as the “Iron Cage of Liberalism”. This signifies the situation where 
international condemnation towards an authoritarian regime flows from the need of 
democratic states to maintain a condemning position in relation to rights-violations by 
such governments, eventually preventing any formal interaction.44 Although for 
smaller states, for example Iran, such condemnation could mean international 
diplomatic and economic isolation, the economic and political global influence of the 
PRC renders it impervious to these isolation and delegitimisation threats. 
Additionally, China is currently a crucial trade partner of the US and the EU, also 
holding, or being seen as a great candidate for taking over, large sums of these 
countries’ high debts.45 Therefore, a very realistic concern has been expressed that 
even the most powerful democratic states would be reluctant to incur the wrath of the 
CCP by openly and actively criticising its restrictive policies, thus, also its Internet-
related restrictions.46 
3.2 Market controls in China and their effects on regulation 
3.2.1 Established controls 
The Chinese market has traditionally been strongly regulated, entailing discouraging 
requirements for foreign telecommunications investments and financially burdensome 
compliance policies, which demonstrate a firm governmental grip on Internet market 
growth, especially since many large infrastructural companies remain state-affiliated 
despite their privatisation.47 As research has demonstrated, despite the extensive 
                                                
43 BBC News, “G20 summit agrees on deficit cuts by 2013” (2010) available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/10429446.stm (accessed 26 Jul 12); A Guiora and S Riotte, see 
note 39 above, at 15; L Solum and M Chung, “The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the 
Law” University San Diego Public Law Research Paper No. 55, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=416263 (accessed 26 Jul 12), at 73. 
44 D Ritter and A Trechsel, “Revolutionary Cells: On the Role of Texts, Tweets, and Status Updates in 
Nonviolent Revolutions”, (2011) Paper presented at Conference: Internet, Voting and Democracy 
(Laguna Beach, California), at 4-5.	  	  
45 Many EU states even support the lifting of the arms embargo, which was imposed in 1989 after the 
Tienanmen Square protests were brutally repressed. W Morrison, see note 40 above; D Steibock, “EU 
Centre Policy Brief No.3: The Eurozone Debt Crisis and the Role of China” (2011) Policy Paper of the 
EU Centre in Singapore available at http://aei.pitt.edu/33650/ (accessed 27 Jul 12).  
46 J Groves, “Silence on Human Rights...The Price Europe Must Pay for China's Billions” available at 
www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2054929/EU-debt-deal-China-buys-Europes-silence-human-
rights.html (accessed 26 Jul 12). 
47 G Wacker, “The Internet and Censorship in China” in C Hughes and G Wacker (eds), China and the 
Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward (London: Routledge, 2003) 58-79, at 64-5; J Goldsmith 
and T Wu, see note 3 above, at 93; P Sohmen, “Taming the Dragon: China’s Efforts to Regulate the 
Internet” (2001) 1 Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs 17-26, at 17.   
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obligations the PRC was supposed to fulfil in terms of trade liberalisation and market 
openness policies, the Chinese state has often created conditions that promote 
indigenous businesses and create hurdles for foreign companies, consequently 
maintaining a stricter control on its market and promoting indigenous businesses.48 
Furthermore, as seen above, it has demonstrated a disinclination to conform to the 
open competition standards that the WTO has demanded, allowing the state to 
maintain a firm grip on commercial activity.49 
Additionally, international information technology (IT) corporations invest in Chinese 
companies with similar interests, such as filtering technologies, becoming 
stakeholders and supporting the rise of the indigenous Internet conglomerates, which 
have structured their business plans and products based on the CCP’s restrictive 
philosophies.50 This internal, self-serving market, the products of which are also 
appealing for many regimes around the world like Iran, Saudi Arabia etc, strongly 
reinforces China’s growing influence in information technologies and its potential 
autarky in managing its internal IT needs, with many domestic Internet platforms 
outpacing western ones.51 The CCP’s extent of control reaches from Internet Service 
Providers down to small, private companies, such as Internet cafes and content 
providers, as it promulgates regulatory incentives or obligations to have the 
commercial sector also assist in filtering content and monitoring of ambiguous use.52 
Moreover, foreign corporations, like Yahoo, Google, Cisco etc have colluded with the 
CCP in order to partake in PRC’s market, filtering search engine results, blogs and 
even disclosing dissidents’ data to the government, subsequently provoking 
international condemnation and even Congressional hearings.53 Nevertheless, despite 
the criticisms, no ban on US information technology exports has ensued. Although 
many organisations and even the US Congress have tried to pressure these 
                                                
48 W Morrison, see note 40 above.  
49 Ibid. 
50 K Regan, “Yahoo investing $1billion in Chinese Internet Company” (2005) available at 
http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/45411.html?wlc=1276283884 (accessed 27 Jul 12); Electronics 
Design Strategy News, “Intel invests in 3 Chinese Companies” (2005) available at 
http://www.edn.com/article/469101-Intel_Invests_in_3_Chinese_Companies.php (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
51 OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in China 2009” (2009) available at 
http://opennet.net/research/profiles/china (accessed 27 Jul 12), at 5; R Winfield and K Mendoza, “Does 
China Hope to remap the Internet in its own Image? A Memorandum by the World Press Freedom 
Committee” (2007) available at 
http://www.wpfc.org/site/docs/pdf/Does%20China%20Hope%20to%20Remap%20the%20Internet%20
in%20its%20Own%20Image.pdf (accessed 27 Jul 12) at 4; H Zhang, “China's Technology Companies 
Achieve Over 1,000% Growth” (2007) available at 
http://www.lifeofguangzhou.com/node_10/node_34/node_190/node_493/2007/10/26/11933588702917
9.shtml (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
52 J Goldsmith and T Wu, see note 3 above, at 96-7; L Solum, see note 26 above, at 69-70. 
Especially for cybercafes, the state has promoted schemes of chain-store model standardisation for 
management, which could facilitate the tightening of control, putting many cafes under specific 
monitored plans, while unregistered cafes would be hunted and closed down. B Liang and H Lu, see 
note 22 above, at 114. 
53 Amnesty international, “Undermining Freedom of Expression in China: The Role of Yahoo!, 
Microsoft and Google” (2006) available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/POL300262006ENGLISH/$File/POL3002606.pdf (accessed 27 Jul 
12); M Nawyn, see note 27 above. 
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corporations, market liberalisation philosophies prevent the imposition of any actual 
governmental restriction on the commercial policies of those multinational 
corporations doing business in China.54 Therefore, western companies are able and 
usually do make all the necessary concessions in order to be allowed to operate within 
China and benefit from its huge consumer base. There has been one exception, that of 
Google eventually leaving China after continued conflicts with government 
practices.55 However, the CCP and PRC’s market have remained unfazed, with 
indigenous companies absorbing Google’s market share, while the political motives 
of Google’s move have also been doubted - its move to Honk Kong being attributed 
mainly to business management choices.56 	  
3.2.2 The changes of market liberalisation 
On the other hand, one could argue that the new technologies, in addition to some 
undoubted efforts at liberalising the market in PRC, have brought changes to the 
operation of various Internet and media companies in relation to information 
generation and distribution. Inevitably, the commercialisation processes introduce 
western perceptions and operational models in the information industries, 
disconnecting such companies from governmental desires, mainly by increasing 
competition and linking financial survival to audience satisfaction.57 More 
particularly, the development of Internet branches of official news agencies and the 
need to attain a broad audience to support Internet growth and investment in the 
agencies, has led to a more liberal enforcement of restrictions, even allowing media 
outlets to create their own news, despite the formal prohibitions.58 Many unofficial 
sites also republish news, either downloaded or translated from foreign websites, 
disregarding the governmental dictates.59  
                                                
54 R Winfield and K Mendoza, see note 51 above, at ; A Lin and Y Shan, “Global Online Freedom Act 
would create dilemma for Beijing”, (2010) available at 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/content/view/28531/ (accessed 27 Jul 12); C Li, see note 2 above, at 
66. 
55  J York, “Google.cn redirects to Hong Kong... for Now” (2010) available at 
http://opennet.net/blog/2010/03/googlecn-redirects-hong-kongfor-now (accessed 27 Jul 12).	  
56 E MacAskill, “Google shift to Hong Kong played down by US” (2010) available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/mar/23/us-google-china-reaction (accessed 27 Jul 12); A 
Tse, “Google vs China vs Baidu, who wins?” (2010) available at 
http://www.thestreet.com/story/10712603/2/google-vs-china-vs-baidu-who-wins.html (accessed 27 Jul 
12). Aljazeera, “Fallout from Google China Row grows” (2010) available at 
http://english.aljazeera.net/business/20english.aljazeera.net10/03/201032525940733731.html (accessed 
27 Jul 12); M Helft, “For Google, a Threat to China With Little Revenue at Stake” (2010) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/15/world/asia/15google.html?ref=asia (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
57 Z Tai, see note 31 above, at 110-1; J Zhu, “Roadblock and Roadmap: Circumventing Press 
Censorship in China in the new media dimension” (2008-9) 30 University of La Verne Law Review 
404-466. 
58 B Liebman, “Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System” (2005) 105 
Columbia Law Review, 1-157, at 60-1. 
59 J Wang, “The Internet and the E-commerce in China: Challenge of the WTO” available at 
http://home.etf.rs/~vm/cd1/papers/93.pdf (accessed 27 Jul 12) 1-54, at 17. 
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However, the CCP seems to be finding alternative, indirect ways to restrict the 
dangerous consequences of liberalisation by integrating many state agencies into the 
various market sectors, thus perpetuating its original incumbent position in the new IT 
and media market.60 Moreover, even after the introduction of the Internet, most 
regulations were, and up until today are,61 aiming at containing the flow of 
information and securing the economic interests of the state-owned media.62 The 
authorities have also been demonstrating their control capabilities by shutting down 
web TV sites and promoting extra regulation on Internet publishing, singling out 
bloggers and webcasting, as the sources through which foreign news are being 
“smuggled” into Chinese cyberspace.63 Arguably, the regime has even attempted to 
hack into Google’s servers in order to gain access to activist and other politically 
interesting and potentially threatening email communications, demonstrating a very 
aggressive, yet only implicitly connected to the government, tactic to enforce 
controlling policies, when companies decline to consolidate voluntarily.64 This attack 
is significant symbolically as it establishes the willingness of the regime to go to 
extremes against companies that would try to evade its controlling policies. 
Furthermore, the Chinese government retains absolute control over the physical 
gateways to the global Internet and therefore ISPs connecting to these government-
controlled backbone networks must be licensed, which inevitably means that ISPs will 
have to follow government dictates in order to maintain their operability within the 
PRC.65  
The above facts indicate clearly how the CCP has the potential to shape its Internet 
market based on its demands and standards and it is extensively exercising its control,  
                                                
60 P Lovelock and J Ure, “E-Government In China” in J Zhang and M Woesler (eds) “China's Digital 
Dream: The Impact of the Internet on the Chinese Society” (Bochum: The University Press Bochum, 
2002), at 13; Z Wen, “Traditional Chinese Media fights Crisis, embraces New Era”, (2010) available at 
http://china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-03/515835.html (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
61 Commercial portal sites must normally obtain permission from the Central Government Information 
Office to carry news. Even with permission, they can only publish news provided by official 
government information organs such as the People’s Daily and the Xinhua News Agency, and are 
banned from carrying any news items based on their own interviews or from other sources. Also, no 
China-based websites without separate approval by the State Council Information Office, is allowed to 
link to overseas news websites or carry news from overseas news media or websites. See L Li, 
“China’s Information Policy” (2003) TPRC, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2060570 (accessed 
27 Jul 12) at 6; Major search engines and portals must not post their own commentary articles and 
instead make available only opinion pieces generated by government-controlled newspapers and news 
agencies.  Private individuals or groups must register as "news organizations", which most of the time 
might prove problematic, before they can operate e-mail distribution lists that spread news or 
commentary. Existing online news sites, like those run by newspapers or magazines, must give priority 
to news and commentary pieces distributed by the leading national and provincial news organs. J Khan, 
“China Tightens Its Restrictions for News Media on the Internet” (2005) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/26/international/asia/26china.html?ex=1189137600&en=2cecba9398
a679ae&ei=5070 (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
62 G Wacker, see note 47 above, at 62-3. 
63 Amnesty International, “People’s Republic of China the Olympics countdown: Repression of 
Activists Overshadows Death Penalty and Media Reforms” (2006) available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170152007 (accessed 27 Jul 12), at 25-26. 
64 W Morrison, see note 40 above, at 26. 
65 L Solum, see note 26 above, at 69-70.	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not just on information generation and distribution, but also on the software and 
hardware generated by both indigenous and foreign companies. This power is mainly 
realised by either enforcing compliance of local incumbents or implicitly integrating 
compliant state agencies in important industry areas and also by inducing compliance 
through the allure of its profitable market for overseas corporations. Consequently, 
this means that the state dictates which Internet- and telecommunications-related 
companies are allowed to operate within its Great Firewall. The Party’s choices also 
relate to the hardware and software these companies employ, which will naturally 
have to conform to the Party’s prescribed standards and regulations. Such practices 
ultimately reduce transparency and limit the choice of accessible information to what 
is prescribed by the ideology, morality and public safety notions that the government 
dictates. 
3.3 Code: regulating versus liberating 
The above argument becomes even clearer once the actual nature of code which is 
employed and promoted by the CCP has been reviewed. Despite the CCP’s denial that 
organised censoring is taking place on its Internet communications, extensive 
regulations have gradually set up a multilayered filtering network essentially 
supervised by the state as a main method of controlling content.66 The capabilities of 
this state-controlled Internet infrastructure were greatly expanded after the 
introduction of a fiber-optic, CN2 network supporting a pyramidal filtering structure. 
Filtering begins at the state-managed international gateways, spreading to 
governmental ISPs through which private ISPs connect, with the filtering and 
blocking even reaching down to individual user level.67  
Filtering techniques employ various, overlapping types of filtering, such as keyword 
searches, domain name level and search engine filtering, email and bulletin board 
monitoring and erasure.68 The topics being censored and the level of blocking 
strictness vary, with sensitive political content like Tibet Independence sites, as well 
as pornography sites and blogs being frequently blocked.69 Social networking sites 
like YouTube or Facebook are also blocked extensively, while most western media 
and human rights sites are seldom unavailable, yet the extensiveness of filtering 
combined with its erratic application hinders any precise assessment of its extent.70  
This fluctuating vagueness and the overlapping webs of filtering and blocking, some 
automated, some man-monitored, create even more opaqueness in relation to the 
                                                
66 R Winfield and K Mendoza, see note 51 above, at 3; R Nawyn, see note 27 above, at 513; N 
Anderson, “Internet Governance Forum takes on China, US” (2006) available at 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20061031-8115.html (accessed 27 Jul 12); Z Tai, see note 31 
above, at 102-3; T Lum, “Internet Development and Information Control in the People’s Republic of 
China” (2006) Congress Research Service Report for Congress available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA462477 (accessed 27 Jul 12); L Li, see 
note 61 above, at 24-5. 
67 J Goldsmith and T Wu, see note 3 above, at 96-7; M Nawyn, see note 27 above, at 516-9. 
68 A Cheung, see note 27 above, at 9; OpenNet Initiative, see note 51 above, at 17-8. 
69 OpenNet Initiative, “Internet Filtering in China in 2004-2005: A Country Study” available at 
http://www.opennetinitiative.net/studies/china/ (accessed 27 Jul 12); OpenNet Initiative, see note 51 
above. 
70 Ibid.	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allowable materials and the extent to which users could access information. This 
arbitrariness further increases information restriction due to the lack of any 
independent controlling mechanisms based on publicly accessible standards, which 
could in turn allow for the monitoring of filtering excesses by the citizens or any 
independent authority. Technical filtering is also inevitably supplemented by a self-
regulatory over-reaction by plain users, who, being unaware of the exact limitations 
they should abide by, often end up limiting themselves far more than they might have 
to. After all, solely the knowledge of existence and application of digital measures of 
surveillance could be enough to restrict activity and effect censorship, consequently 
limiting public civic discourse that might threaten the CCP’s supremacy.71   
It would appear that the CCP has managed to impose strong limitations on the ability 
as well as the ultimate willingness to view and publish content that would be 
undesirable by the CCP, employing code-based controls on many different levels, 
from central infrastructures, such as international gateways, to plain service providers, 
such as cybercafes. In parallel, the size of the PRC market also creates a great 
incentive for the generation of code that conforms to the designated CCP standards, 
thus extensively influencing the current, as well as the prospective code 
developments. As Lessig argues, code creation is synonymous to power and this 
power is now mainly in the hands of commercial enterprises.72 However, in the case 
of China, these private actors are induced or restricted by governmental regulations in 
order to align their code with the state’s operational standards. Most companies, being 
naturally more interested in the profits the booming Chinese market can offer, often 
conform to governmental standards of code-design.73 Therefore, the CCP’s grip on 
code seems unchallenged, since infrastructure and software come either from 
colluding foreign companies, like Microsoft and Cisco74 or from developing 
indigenous manufacturers originally set on following the government’s provisions and 
technological standards.75 Simultaneously, China’s expanding IT market allows it to 
also export standards of network design, influencing the nature and orientation of 
global production of code. Finally, the global proliferation of similar filtering and 
surveillance technologies, even in western countries, also voids any political pressure 
in relation to code development that western democracies could exercise against the 
restrictive code employed by the PRC, since many western state agencies and 
legislatures sponsor similar technologies and standards.76 
On the other hand, one could say that technology also compromises the CCP’s 
capacity to control information through code, since circumventive methods, such as 
anti-blocking/encryption software, mirror sites, anonymous e-mail services, peer to 
                                                
71 G Wacker, see note 47 above, at 60. 
72 L Lessig, see note 5 above, at 79. 
73 J Mulvenon, “Golden Shields and Panopticons: Beijing’s Evolving Internet Control Policies” (2008) 
9 Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 115-120, at 119. 
74 OpenNet Initiative, see note 69 above, at 6-7; A Cheung, see note 27 above, at 29-30. 
75 R Winfield and K Mendoza, see note 51, at 4. 
76 G Wacker, see note 47 above, at 71-2; Electronic Privacy Information Centre “Carnivore” (2005) 
available at http://www.epic.org/privacy/carnivore/ (accessed 27 Jul 12); J Peronne, “The Echelon Spy 
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peer technologies and more could bypass most of the above limitations abound on the 
Internet.77 Such measures are being extensively used by activists and users that desire 
to communicate – protected from governmental controls – and access restricted 
information and websites from abroad.78 However, many of those measures require 
more than average technical knowledge, are time-consuming and can entail a relative 
risk of exposure to state sanctions – difficulties which discourage everyday users. 
Consequently, such tactics are adopted by a small minority of users. It is questionable 
whether such small groups could turn the tide against the vast majority; particularly, 
since the majority is still either incapable or reluctant to circumvent the existing 
technical controls and happy with the Internet experience already provided to them, 
having known no different, free cyberspace.  
China has even managed to block access to the Tor anonymising network, which 
normally allows users to encrypt their communications and send them through a 
network of volunteer relay computers, making tracing of the original sender 
impossible. As research has shown, the two major telecoms companies (China 
Telecom, China Unicom) have taken up this task and have managed to block access to 
the initial Tor gateways, essentially preventing the use of Tor for PRC users.79 The 
regime has also reportedly attacked Virtual Private Networks (VPN), creating 
software that could monitor such encrypting connections that are very commonly used 
by Chinese users for bypassing the technological filters of the PRC, inducing further 
self-censoring in Universities and businesses, where the restrictions on VPN have 
mostly focused.80 All these efforts demonstrate the advanced sophistication and extent 
to which the PRC would go in order to prevent uninhibited communications between 
Chinese users and with the rest of the world. In extreme cases, the regime has even 
resorted to temporarily shutting the Internet down to maintain control of the 
information flows in specific areas during critical periods.81  
Moreover, the main strength of the Internet for democratisation, openness and 
resistance to restrictive regulation is the convergence of interconnected, innovative 
applications and platforms consisting of multiple contributions from a constant flow 
                                                
77 J Lacharite, “Electronic Decentralisation in China: A Critical Analysis of Internet Filtering Policies 
in the People's Republic of China”, (2002) 37/2 Australian Journal of Political Science 333 – 346, at 
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China” (2008) 134 Public Choice 31-46, at 33-4. 
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technologies, online games, blogs and chat forums. This paints a more diverse picture, marring the 
image of discipline the regime is trying to maintain and impacting much more radically on the 
morphology of the internet, both within and without the PRC, see: J Qiu, “The Internet in China: Data 
and Issues”, (2003) Working paper, Annenberg Research Seminar on International Communication, 
available at http://arnic.info/Papers/JQ_China_and_Internet.pdf (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
79 Technology Review, “How China Blocks the Tor Anonymity Network” available at  
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/27697/ (accessed 27 Jul 12). 
80 C Arthur, “China Cracks Down on VPN Use” available at 
www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/may/13/china-cracks-down-on-vpn-use (accessed 27 Jul 12) 
81 M Chase and J Mulvenon, “You’ve got Dissent! Chinese Dissident Use of the Internet and Beijing’s 
Counter Strategies” (2002) RAND Corporation Monograph Report, at 62.  
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of users, without any informational identification or prioritisation or any central 
controlling factor.82 Chinese policies, though, have negated such unhindered 
interoperability to a large extent through filtering and blocking of the various 
interconnected platforms, even erratically. As seen above, the Chinese state has 
instituted core controlling mechanisms that prioritise certain information and 
applications over others that are deemed controversial, hindering or blocking access to 
various west-originating communications’ sites (Skype, YouTube) and even 
monitoring mobile use.83 Consequently, interoperability also becomes a controlled 
experience, where platforms and online applications are either banned or modified 
before allowing the Chinese users to employ them. This partial “castration” of the 
interoperability of the various code-based applications for information generation and 
distribution maintains the illusion that code propagates the free exchange of 
information. In reality, though, this alleged multi-faceted information exchange has 
first been “purified” by the various regulatory filters, both technical and rule- or 
policy-based that the companies offering these platforms and the applications running 
on them have to abide by.  
3.4 Social norms in the PRC 
 Unavoidably, the extensive grip of the CCP on law-making, market structuring and 
subsequently, code promulgation has influenced Internet-usage norms, while 
simultaneously the goals of the CCP are facilitated by additional, traditionally 
endemic norms of the Chinese society. The dominant norm both inherent in Chinese 
society, but also reinforced by the various aforementioned controls, is self-censorship. 
Initially, self-restrictions are adopted for fear of sanctions, due to legal uncertainty, 
which is pervasive in China. As mentioned before, vague and arbitrarily interpreted 
legal provisions, reinforced by cyber-police and surveillance mechanisms, inevitably 
give rise and perpetuate a feeling of constant scrutiny for users and businesses.84 As 
Wacker states, the best way to create “a firewall in one’s head” is to introduce vague 
terminology and arbitrary interpretation of regulations, with sporadic incidents 
exhibiting enforcement capabilities, something the CCP seems to be expertly 
realising.85 The Chinese government has even attempted to globally introduce its 
views on information and communications technologies by suggesting the adoption of 
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83 T Branigan, “China blocks YouTube” (2009) available at 
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a “World Norm” based on its censoring standards during the Athens Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF).86 
Moreover, two interrelated norms have supplemented self-censorship as the CCP has 
emphasised nationalism and materialism in order to formulate and inscribe the image 
of the ideal Chinese Internet user on public conscience.87 The desirable user, 
therefore, is portrayed as a docile consumer/follower of the CCP morals, who avoids 
controversial uses of the Internet.88 Moreover, the CCP’s control of a large percentage 
of the mainstream media apparatus and its extensive use of propaganda has enabled it 
to dominate norm-creation, since alternative online media have been and are still 
generally censored, while at the same time, state-affiliated, traditional media has been 
modernised, establishing a strong Internet presence and consequently, colonising 
cyberspace-generated information.89  
The CCP, realising the new challenges technologies pose to realising absolute 
information control, has also adopted a new strategy called “Control 2.0”. This 
strategy initially allows information distribution, but pre-empts it, setting the agenda 
for the coverage of controversial news, thus reporting information in ways that could 
be favourable to the regime, rather than blocking it.90 The CCP has even employed 
large numbers of Internet users (the 50cent Army) that access blogs, social 
networking websites and media in order to post pro-Party comments to counter 
dissent and spread state propaganda.91 Since information could more easily 
circumvent the regime’s restrictions with the introduction of the new digital 
technologies, the more efficient strategy would be to control how information is 
ultimately structured and perceived, rather than try to prevent its reception, something 
which the Internet has shown is ultimately futile. Consequently, through such tactics, 
the CCP pre-empts information exchanges and influences expression and bias. 
Additionally, through such techniques, the aims of nurturing nationalistic ideals and 
fostering economic prosperity are achieved more efficiently, establishing those 
elements as the CCP’s central aims as well as normative pillars of its own legitimacy. 
Nationalistic tendencies are also to be anticipated, given the socialist state structure, 
merging the CCP’s survival with the personal interests of citizens, with most citizens 
being public servants in the Chinese state apparatus.92  
Moreover, state-promoted, depoliticising consumerism has transformed the old 
“information superhighway” to an “entertainment superhighway”, where Chinese 
users focus more on the entertaining uses of the Internet, such as online gaming, e-
commerce etc and not so much on seeking information and promoting the politicising 
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uses of the medium.93 Such conceptions, despite being challenged by a growing 
Chinese civil society and an effort to inspire and nurture post-materialist ideals,94 
remain dominant, especially since capitalism and consumerism are internationally 
prominent normative trends.95 Talks about the rising demands and protests against 
state deficiencies and corruption by a newly forming middle class in China reflect 
such consumerist orientations as well. Essentially, citizens still focus on demands 
relating to safer houses and faster means of transportation which are more localised 
and refrain from actually directly challenging the ruling party’s policies on a more 
substantive, ideological-political level.96  
4. Conclusion 
Is the Internet, therefore, capable of realising its democratising effects in China or is 
the CCP adequately in control of the medium, nullifying its alleged potential for 
political change and openness? From what has been discussed above, one could at 
least argue that for the moment, change towards more open, democratic models of 
Internet organisation and regulation appears to be at a nascent, if not doubtful, stage. 
This is because the CCP still appears to maintain a satisfactory grip on all aspects of 
regulation, employing a triptych of tactics, which include:  
a. blocking in the wider sense,  
b. co-option/pre-emption of political initiatives and information 
respectively and  
c. ultimately resorting to open aggression in order to control all 
possible modalities and actors influencing the regulation of its 
cyberspace. 
More particularly, blocking is the traditional controlling function, originally employed 
by the PRC. Blocking encompasses the regulations and technical measures that 
prohibit certain types of information and certain behaviours from proliferating online 
and which gradually increase in pervasiveness, accuracy and sophistication. Co-
option/pre-emption includes the aforementioned techniques of “Control 2.0”, where 
both online movements and newsfeeds are appropriated by state mechanisms. Such a 
process facilitates the better control of how information is shaped and perceived and 
ensures the public resolves its civil disputes with the authorities in ways that entail the 
least possible contestation to the high-ranking party politicians and the general 
principles of the CCP. Finally, aggression is a more activist tactic, often employed by 
authoritarian regimes in order to coerce and silence dissent. This combines cracking 
down on cybercafes and dissidents or bloggers in real-life with actually attacking code 
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and code-making companies through, for example, employing denial of service 
attacks on dissident websites or trying to hack into the Tor or VPN anonymising 
networks or into Google’s servers. All these three different controlling tactics allow 
extensive control to be exercised by the CCP.  
These three tactics are based on another triptych that has increased the efficiency and 
consistency of these types of control, while it has also reduced potential challenges. 
These three elements are:  
a. global reliance on the Chinese economy,  
b. internal technological development and sufficiency and  
c. the “ideologisation” of established socio-political realities of the 
Chinese state.  
More particularly, the allure of the Chinese economy and market as a support for the 
failing western economies, but also as a flourishing market for western corporations, 
has resulted in the lack of any serious external sanctions to the arbitrary and 
inconsistent actions of the Chinese state in relation to its national trade and human 
rights obligations, leaving its sovereignty largely uncontested. This is also reinforced 
through the collusion of technological giants such as Cisco, Microsoft and Yahoo 
with the regime. 
Partly because of the above integration of obedient corporations into the PRC market 
and partly due to the great investment of the state to new technologies and indigenous 
entrepreneurship, China has also developed an autarkic market of information 
technology companies and products that abides and promotes its designated 
informational control standards. This autarky enables China to become independent of 
the big, western hardware and software companies, since subsidised Chinese 
companies are taking advantage of lax copyright policies, taxation and other 
provisions, which allow them to quickly become efficient and competitive in relation 
to western competitors. The Chinese state, thus, develops the capacity to require very 
little external IT support, which subsequently, empowers it to promote whatever 
policy it desires without having to conform to foreign standards of technological 
development and functionality, even threatening to create a closed Chinese Internet, 
independent from the global one.  
Finally, the Maoist tradition with its huge state-centred organisation, sanctified single 
party political structure and strict moral foundations and traditions has facilitated the 
political legitimisation of the aforementioned policies on the basis of national security 
and preservation of the ideological heritage of the Party and has greatly discouraged 
the evolution of an internal ideological and political initiative. The combination of the 
above factors  has allowed the regime to remain almost uncontested ideologically. 
This lack of any serious ideological challenge has in turn, provided stronger 
legitimising bases for the  aforementioned controlling policies the CCP has adopted. 
These controls and restrictions further reinforce the aforementioned established 
norms, thus creating a vicious cycle. 
One cannot ignore the voices finding hope for change in various incidents of civil 
society political initiatives, casual bypassing of filtering controls and alternative 
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media sharing global news and exposing regime injustices.97 Despite the fact that this 
multifaceted regulatory power might not be absolute, with the Internet having created 
some cracks, the levels of control are still adequately extensive, thorough and 
enforced with relative consistency, allowing the CCP to ultimately steer Internet use 
towards the direction it desires for the vast majority of citizens. 98 As Goldsmith has 
argued “the question is whether regulation will heighten the cost of the activity 
sufficiently to achieve its acceptable control from whatever normative perspective is 
appropriate.”99  
Consequently, even if filtering and policing controls are circumvented, China seems 
to have already set legal, technical, business and normative standards that portray 
such counter-control tactics as deviant, counterintuitive, criminal and even threatening 
of Chinese traditions. Additionally, the opaqueness of the chaotic regulatory structure 
results in the vast majority of users and companies being unaware of the kind and the 
extent of information that is being blocked or filtered and also induces them to refrain 
from challenging the surveillance and filtering measures employed in case they are 
spotted by state employed monitors. This greatly increases the potential cost of 
attempting these circumventions, at least for the majority. The Internet has been 
transformed by the CCP to become a supervisory tool for the government, an 
officially sanctioned governance tool, rather than a subversive medium, with many 
authorities having even set up informant websites dealing with corrupt officials and 
with the majority of citizens approving such initiatives, finding them as a positive step 
towards democratisation.100  
Furthermore, the Chinese Government White Paper on the Internet is indicative of the 
tendency of the regime to deny any allegation of unconstitutional, excessive 
information controls and restrictions and to suggest that any possible control only 
exists for the protection of Internet security, its users and ultimately, the nation 
itself.101 The White Paper is an impressive documentation of how everything relating 
to the Internet in China and its potential controls are portrayed by the state as being 
premised upon basic state principles and constitutionally-accepted laws and 
regulations. The presumption of normality and legitimacy is in fact so pervasive in the 
text that, if read without any factual knowledge, it paints an ideal image of the 
Chinese Internet, even for western standards. The state, thus, justifies its controls and 
regulations in ways that any defiance would render the objectors as enemies of the 
state or at least deviant and malevolent towards the development of the Internet and 
the safe surfing of citizens. McKinnon has excellently summed up the tactics 
described above as phenomena networked authoritarianism, where authoritarian 
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practices are explicitly and implicitly blended with the everyday life functions of the 
public.102 
Consequently, until some important shift in the social class balance and subsequently, 
in the socio-political groups’ capacity to exercise political power, the CCP’s 
restrictive policies will survive and dominate the Chinese cyberspace and define the 
organisational bases of the PRC. As it is reported, even during the current economic 
crisis, where presumably disaffection against the regime should rise, “there's little 
sign that the current economic downturn is leading to widespread social unrest – still 
less open opposition to the government.”103 Added to that, recent reports show that 
respective CCP policies have intensified, rather than abated, especially since the 
financial crisis has presumably created the need for more social stability and 
subsequently, more concretised and extensive regulation.104 The Chinese state has 
repeatedly and explicitly demonstrated its dislike for any reform initiatives through 
the above policies and tactics, having often also resorted to severe penalties against 
dissenters, with some even strangely disappearing after having voiced their 
disagreement with regime policies.105 
China might be making some concessions, mainly in order to achieve technological 
integration, better economic agreements and international cooperation, or it might 
modernise its perceptions and accept the inevitability of information flows despite the 
controls. Yet, more general reconciliation on Internet policies seems highly unlikely 
on a mass scale for now. Cyberspace is currently a crucial tool for the CCP’s desire 
for development and control and the Party does not seem willing to relinquish its 
control over its various functions. Rather, it seems to relentlessly be making efforts to 
extend its control through alternative, pro-active and implicit methods to the various 
channels and hubs that produce and propagate information and could also potentially 
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nourish dissent. Eventually, the CCP is not just changing the normative and practical 
structure of the medium externally, but is becoming an intrinsic part of it, attempting 
to project its characteristics in every aspect of it globally. As Lessig solemnly argues, 
the way cyberspace was when it was first created is not the only way cyberspace 
could be.106 China is so far the living proof of that realisation. Its multi-faceted tactics 
demonstrate that, even if what cyberspace is cannot be completely shaped according 
to the regime’s will, its will and ways can implicitly infiltrate the various aspects of 
the Internet, “infecting” even the remaining open and free elements and activities in it. 
Sadly, China is also not alone in this, since a growing number of states, even in the 
democratic western world, are gradually joining it in attempting to transform the 
Internet according to more restrictive standards. Whether a Chinese model of the 
Internet will prevail, even beyond China, remains to be seen. 
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